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INTRODUCTION 
National court involvement in international arbitration is a fact of 
life as prevalent as the weather. National courts become involved in 
arbitration for a whole host of reasons, but do so primarily because 
national laws are permissive and parties invite or encourage them to 
do so.1 But what is the nature of such involvement? Does it 
complement or impede the arbitration process? Is there a place for 
any court involvement at all in the system referred to as international 
arbitration? 
The aim of this Article is to discuss these issues. First, this Article 
will discuss the fundamental characteristics of international 
arbitration as it co-exists with national courts.  Next, this Article will 
survey the different stages of national court involvement in the 
international arbitration process and the forms of court involvement.  
Further, this Article will analyze court awarded injunctions that act 
to support of the international arbitration process.  Lastly, this Article 
will conclude with an assessment of whether court involvement is 
helpful to the international arbitration process. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
There are four essential characteristics of international arbitration. 
First, international arbitration has an autonomous character and 
exists in a domain independent of and separate from national laws 
 1. See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security for 
Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (in 
Toto): Article 46, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155, 156 (1998) (supporting the use of 
arbitration by contracting parties because of the simplicity, lower cost, stability, 
and binding nature of the process). 
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and jurisdictions.2 Arbitration does not, as some have suggested, 
operate solely on the basis of contract, or from the relinquishment of 
jurisdictional control by states, or even a combination of these two 
things. Instead, arbitration is an autonomous system with a life of its 
own that inhabits a domain wholly outside any system of national 
law.3 Access to the autonomous domain of international arbitration is 
obtained through contract and the relinquishment of rights by 
national courts. However, once entered, and subject to controls as 
discussed later, arbitration exists in its own rarefied domain. 
Secondly, by their choice of arbitration parties have expressed a 
positive selection of an alternative dispute resolution system.4 This is 
so even when national law has been chosen as the substantive law of 
the contract or the curial law of the arbitration. More specifically, the 
parties have intentionally and expressly rejected the jurisdiction of 
those courts. Parties  make this choice for various reasons, such as 
the national courts’ being unacceptable, unsuitable, or inappropriate 
in the circumstances of the case.5 Regardless of their reasons, the 
parties have agreed the courts should take a back seat. The question 
is how far back the courts should be and when the courts should 
come forward. 
Third, except in rare circumstances, the arbitral tribunal has 
primary responsibility for resolving all matters relating to the 
settlement of the dispute between the parties.6 Through the principle 
of “separability,” the agreement to arbitrate can survive even where 
 2. See generally Julian D M Lew QC, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous 
Arbitration? in ARBITRATION INSIGHTS, 455, 455-85 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas 
A. Mistelis eds., 2007) [hereinafter Lew, Achieving the Dream] (discussing the 
“dream” of international arbitration as its existence in its own private non-national 
sphere, and the “nightmare” as anti-arbitration injunctions, which are designed to 
protect the nationals of the issuing court). 
 3. See Lew, supra note 2, at 457. 
 4. See Horning, supra note 1, at 156. 
 5. See id. at 156-57 (listing reasons why parties choose arbitration over 
national courts, which include the avoidance of arbitrary jury decisions, the ability 
to command the attention of knowledgeable decision makers, and the final and 
binding character of any decision). 
 6. Cf. Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim Measures of Protection in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated Results, 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 2003, at 55, 59 (stating that the support for 
ordering ex parte interim measures is derived from the fact that resolving disputes 
is a necessary component of arbitration). 
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the underlying agreement may be in doubt or found to be invalid or 
illegal.7 Through the principle of “competence-competence,” the 
arbitral tribunal is entitled, if not duty bound, to determine its own 
jurisdiction.8 These principles are by and large now widely 
recognized. 
Fourth, despite the autonomous nature of arbitration, it must be 
recognized that just as no man or woman is an island, so no system 
of dispute resolution can exist in a vacuum. Without prejudice to 
autonomy, international arbitration does regularly interact with 
national jurisdictions for its existence to be legitimate and for 
support, help, and effectiveness.9 This assistance of the national 
courts takes on different forms at different stages of the arbitration 
process because: (1) national laws are required to recognize and 
enforce the agreement to arbitrate and enforce any award;10 
(2) national laws are required to support the arbitration process 
during the arbitration;11 and (3) international arbitration has 
established certain fundamental standards that require policing at the 
national level.12 These standards are recognized by the international 
community and reflected in international instruments, international 
public policy and due process.13
 7. See Tanya J. Monestier, “Nothing Comes of Nothing”… Or does It??? A 
Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 
12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223, 224 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court decision 
in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967), where the Court 
recognized that arbitration clauses are separable from the contract in which they 
are contained). 
 8. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 243-44 (citing First Options of Chicago, 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). 
 9. See William W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 30 (1983). 
 10. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards art. III, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (requiring all 
contracting states to recognize arbitral awards as binding). 
 11. See id. art. II, § 3 (stating that the court of the contracting state shall, in the 
case of parties who have signed an agreement and at the request of one of the 
parties, refer disputes to arbitration). 
 12. See Park, supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that an arbitrator must bow to 
some of the “mandatory norms of the country in which he sits”). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing the nature of enforcement and the effect that 
the New York Convention has on the relationship of arbitration to the nation in 
which it occurs). 
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In this overall scheme international arbitration can be envisaged as 
a giant squid which seeks nourishment from the murky oceanic world 
where the domain of international arbitration and national 
jurisdiction meet. One might therefore speak of the international 
arbitration process as stretching its tentacles down from the domain 
of international arbitration to the national legal systems to forage for 
legitimacy, support, recognition, and effectiveness. 
II. FORMS OF COURT INVOLVEMENT 
With these four characteristics as the backdrop, this Section will 
discuss the most common forms of court involvement with 
international arbitration. Before doing that, however, it is appropriate 
to remember the requirements under the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
“New York Convention”), which has now been ratified by 144 
countries.14 The Convention provides that: (1) each contracting state 
must “recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration . . . concerning a subject matter 
capable of settlement by arbitration”;15 (2) courts of contracting 
states, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration 
agreement, must “at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, 
inoperative, or incapable of being performed”;16 (3) each Contracting 
State, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration 
agreement, must “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them in accordance with the rules of . . . the territory where the 
award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in” the 
Convention;17 and (4) the court at the place where enforcement of an 
award is sought can refuse recognition and/or enforcement of such an 
award only in specified limited circumstances. These limited 
circumstances include the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, 
lack of notice of the arbitration, that the subject matter of the award 
 14. See  Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (listing the 
names and ratification dates of all 143 States Parties). 
 15. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 1. 
 16. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 17. Id. art. III. 
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is not a difference contemplated by the arbitration agreement, or that 
the composition of the tribunal or the procedure followed was 
contrary to that agreed by the parties.18
A close reading of Articles II, III and V of the New York 
Convention reveals two crucial principles of international arbitration. 
First, court involvement is required as support for the arbitral process 
and for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
awards but nothing else.19 In this context, any other national court 
involvement in the international arbitration process is arguably 
illegitimate, including actions to protect nationals of a particular 
country, to intimidate arbitrators, to protect national commercial or 
jurisdictional interests, or simply because the court thinks that it is 
better suited than an arbitral tribunal to decide on an issue. 
Second, the only courts that should become involved in the 
arbitration process are those at the seat of arbitration or the place of 
enforcement.20 It is here, as will be seen later in the context of the 
use of anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunctions, that the intervention of 
the courts conflicts with these accepted international rules.  In 
addition to these two principles, it is also widely accepted that there 
is a hierarchy between the court of the seat of arbitration and the 
court of enforcement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
recently expressed this in the following terms: “Under the [New 
York] Convention, ‘the country in which, or under the [arbitration] 
law of which, [an] award was made’ is said to have primary 
jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All other signatory States are 
secondary jurisdictions, in which parties can only contest whether 
that State should enforce the arbitral award.”21
 18. Id. art. V (adding that courts may refuse to recognize arbitral awards that 
are not yet binding or suspended by the competent authority in the country where 
the award was granted). 
 19. Cf. James A. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities 
Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and 
International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 54-55 (2005) (discussing 
the split in U.S. circuit courts over the authority created statutorily and within the 
New York Convention for review of nondomestic awards). 
 20. See Jan Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: 
When and Why It Matters, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 55 (1983) (stating that the 
situs of an arbitration is chosen for its “appropriateness given the context of a 
particular case”). 
 21. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
  
2009] NATIONAL COURT INVOLVEMENT 495 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law, which records what are generally 
considered the standards and practices of international arbitration and 
the most appropriate national law for international arbitration,22 
contains similar provisions to the New York Convention but is more 
expansive as to the role of the courts.23 Its approach is clearly stated 
in its early provisions: Article 5 provides that “no court shall 
intervene except where so provided in this Law,”24 and Article 6 
designates just three areas for court involvement in an arbitration 
within its jurisdiction.25 First, it provides for assistance with the 
appointment of a tribunal: Articles 11.3, 11.4, 13 and 14 provide for 
court assistance to ensure the proper appointment of a tribunal where 
the appointing mechanism fails, there is a challenge to the 
independence and impartiality of an arbitrator, or an arbitrator 
becomes incapable of performing his duties.26 Second, it allows 
review of issues of fundamental jurisdiction: Article 16.3 gives the 
court the power to revisit issues concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
in light of the terms of the arbitration agreement.27 Third, it allows 
parties to challenge an award: Article 34 provides for those 
exceptional conditions where the court may set aside or overturn an 
award.28 Like the New York Convention, these are limited to 
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003), in re Karah Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 22. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 
U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW]; Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral 
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363, 363-64 (2001) 
(outlining the problem with creating a clear distinction between domestic and 
international arbitration and suggesting that adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law could be a solution). 
 23. See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International 
Arbitration: An Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable 
Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 975 (1998) (stating that the Model 
Law was “intended to help liberalize international commercial litigation by 
minimizing the role of domestic courts and by giving full effect to party 
autonomy”). 
 24. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 5. 
 25. Id. art. 6. 
 26. Id. art. 11, §§ 3-4, art. 13, § 3, art. 14. 
 27. Id. art. 16, § 3. 
 28. Id. art. 34. 
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whether the issues determined come within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement or there has been some procedural irregularity 
in the conduct of the arbitration. There is no provision allowing the 
national court to review the tribunal’s decision on the merits. Lastly, 
Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law contain almost identical 
provisions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards as 
in the New York Convention.29
III. THE STAGES AT WHICH COURTS CAN AND 
DO BECOME INVOLVED 
As is evident from the thumbnail overview of the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law above, there are four 
stages when courts are most likely to become involved with the 
arbitration process: (1) prior to the establishment of a tribunal; (2) at 
the commencement of the arbitration; (3) during the arbitration 
process; and (4) during the enforcement stage.30
A. PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL 
Prior to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, courts become 
involved where a party initiates proceedings to challenge the validity 
of the arbitration agreement; where one party institutes court 
proceedings despite, and perhaps with the intention of avoiding, the 
agreement to arbitrate; and where one party needs urgent protection 
that cannot await the appointment of the tribunal. 
In all cases, the court’s duty is to uphold the agreement to 
arbitrate. In the first and second cases, the court must deal with this 
in accordance with the New York Convention, i.e., refer the matter to 
arbitration if there is a valid arbitration agreement.31 Differences 
exist between national laws as to what extent the courts can review 
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement before the arbitral 
 29. Compare id., arts. 35-36, with New York Convention, supra note 10, arts. 
III, V. 
 30. See JULIAN D.M. LEW QC ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 367-74 (2003). 
 31. See New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 1 (mandating that 
signatory states recognize “agreement[s] in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen”). 
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tribunal has done so.32 In the third case, the court fills the gap until 
the tribunal is established to protect the status quo. Many national 
laws allow, as does the UNCITRAL Model Law by omission, for 
courts to grant interim relief before the tribunal has been established 
or where the applicable arbitration rules do not allow arbitrators to 
grant interim measures of protection.33 Most would agree that, at this 
stage, national court intervention is not disruptive, and may be 
beneficial to the arbitration proceedings.34 Exceptionally, this might 
not be the case where the requested measures can be postponed, or 
the court effectively has to pre-empt the decision of the tribunal. 
B. AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION 
Court intervention at the commencement of an arbitration 
generally involves assisting with the appointment of and challenges 
to arbitrators. As is reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law and in 
most national laws, the court here uses its authority to give effect to 
the parties’ agreement by establishing an appropriate tribunal to take 
over and deal with the dispute between the parties where the 
prescribed appointment mechanism does not work.35
C. DURING THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
Court involvement during the arbitration process comes in many 
forms and is rarely dealt with in arbitration statutes. Properly 
exercised, this involves courts’ making procedural orders that cannot 
be ordered or enforced by arbitrators, or orders for maintaining the 
status quo. These measures are generally helpful.36 There are also 
 32. See Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. [2007] UKHL 40, ¶ 19 
(U.K.) (holding that English courts will refrain from an overly technical approach 
to the determination of the validity of arbitration clauses, and seek to uphold the 
agreement to arbitrate wherever this is practically possible). 
 33. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 471-73 (providing 
examples of Swiss and Swedish laws that allow courts to provide interim relief, but 
limit most or all other forms of intervention). 
 34. See YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF 
ARBITRATION 294-95 (2d ed. 2005). 
 35. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 11, § 5 (requiring that a 
court appointing an arbitrator “have due regard to any qualifications required of the 
arbitrator by the agreement of the parties”). 
 36. See generally Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (holding that when the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable, 
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orders for protecting and taking evidence, or otherwise protecting the 
integrity of the arbitration. This type of intervention is generally 
unobjectionable and appropriate in circumstances where the tribunal 
cannot (rather than has refused to) take the measures sought, and the 
intervention has the agreement of the tribunal.37
D. DURING THE ENFORCEMENT STAGE 
Finally after an award has been rendered, the courts may become 
involved in two places: (1) at the place of arbitration, i.e., when a 
party challenges and seeks to set aside the award, or lodges an appeal 
against the award under the applicable arbitral law or regime; or  
(2) at the place of enforcement, where the successful party seeks the 
recognition and enforcement of the award. 
There is one word of caution in all this. Although the principles as 
outlined above are normal and desirable, one should be aware that 
when a national court is asked to deal with any of these issues, it is in 
its simplest form a negation of the arbitration agreement. More 
particularly, a national court will inevitably and unsurprisingly 
approach and determine these issues in accordance with its own 
national law and procedures. More controversially it may also be 
influenced by its parochial, legal, cultural, economic, and political 
system.38
IV. INJUNCTIONS INVOLVING ARBITRATION 
Granting injunctions is one area of court involvement which cuts 
across every stage of the arbitration process and gives rise to a 
number of practical and conceptual difficulties.39 Judge Stephen 
the court should hold in favor of the arbitration). 
 37. See LEW ET AL., supra note 30, at 369-70 (noting the lack of coercive 
power held by arbitration tribunals and the need to use courts in the compelling of 
witnesses and evidence). 
 38. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477 (stressing that national 
courts should not seek to impose their “narrow national viewpoint and approach in 
place of . . . non-national and international process[es]”). 
 39. See Julian D.M. Lew, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts to 
Prevent Arbitration Proceedings, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 25, 25 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) [hereinafter Lew, Anti-Suit 
Injunctions] (noting that anti-suit injunctions potentially destabilize the 
environment surrounding dispute resolution); see also Marco Stacher, You Don’t 
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Schwebel described it as “one of the gravest problems of 
contemporary international commercial arbitration.”40 Injunctions 
come in all shapes and sizes. The focus here will be on injunctions 
that seek to undermine or block arbitration proceedings, i.e., anti-
arbitration injunctions, and those that encourage and enforce 
arbitration proceedings, i.e., anti-suit injunctions and pro-arbitration 
injunctions. 
A. ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS 
Anti-arbitration injunctions are used either before arbitration has 
commenced to prevent the tribunal from being established or after 
proceedings have begun to stop an arbitration in its tracks. 
Injunctions restraining the conduct of arbitration proceedings are in 
general—and should only be—granted where it is absolutely clear 
that the arbitration proceedings have been wrongly brought.41 These 
injunctions can be directed against the parties alone, but also against 
the arbitrators if the court has jurisdiction over them. 
In general, there is a distinction between common law countries 
and civil law countries when it comes to the power to award anti-
arbitration injunctions. Common law countries tend to be permissive 
and therefore more willing to become involved, while civil law 
countries tend to be restrictive and are reluctant to interfere in the 
process chosen by the parties.42 This is not surprising as—at the risk 
Want to Go There – Antisuit Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration, 
23 ASA BULL. 640, 652 (2005) (arguing that injunctions imposed by domestic 
courts potentially interfere with international legal regimes by implying domestic 
skepticism towards the foreign legal scheme and its ability to undertake a treaty in 
good faith). 
 40. Stephen M. Schwebel, Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration – 
An Overview, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra 
note 39, at 5-6. 
 41. Cf. DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON ET AL., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION § 7-052 
(23rd ed. 2007) (noting that in the event a court refuses to stay legal proceedings, 
arbitration will not be undertaken in order to solve the dispute). 
 42. See Julian D M Lew QC, Control of Jurisdiction by Injunctions Issued by 
National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS? 185, 
201 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007) [hereinafter Lew, Control of Jurisdiction] 
(explaining that under the common law regimes of the United States and England, 
a court may only issue an anti-arbitration injunction as a means of shielding its 
jurisdiction against a foreign arbitration, while civil law systems, such as France 
and Sweden, lack a legal basis for granting anti-arbitration injunctions). 
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of gross exaggeration or simplification—common law systems 
generally deal with parallel proceedings on a case by case basis by 
way of forum non conveniens. Civil law systems however use the lis 
alibi pendens principle, i.e., first come first served, and therefore do 
not intervene very much. 
1. England 
In England, for example, courts rely on two statutory provisions to 
give them power to award injunctions in the arbitration context: 
section 72(1) of the Arbitration Act of 1996 and section 37 of the 
Supreme Court Act of 1981. Section 72(1) of the Arbitration Act 
provides in pertinent part that: “1. A person . . . who takes no part in 
[arbitration] proceedings may question— . . . (c) what matters have 
been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement, by proceedings in the court for a declaration or injunction 
or other appropriate relief.”43 Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of 
1981 provides: 
(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or 
final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in 
which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do 
so.  
(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on 
such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.44
These provisions were applied in Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime 
Ltd. (“The Epsilon Rosa”) where an anti-suit injunction was issued 
restraining Welex from proceeding with court proceedings in Poland 
brought in violation of an arbitration agreement.45 The Court of 
Appeal held that even though the Arbitration Act did not give an 
express power to the High Court to grant the injunction, it has a 
general power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions “in all cases in 
which it appears to the Court to be just and convenient to do so.”46 
 43. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 72 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ukpga_19960023_en_1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 44. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 37 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uk/acts/acts1981/PDF/ukpga_19810054_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 45. See Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime Ltd. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 938, [34]-[40] 
(Eng.). 
 46. Id. [40]. 
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This case concerned an appeal against the High Court’s decision to 
grant an anti-suit injunction restraining Welex from proceeding with 
court proceedings in Poland brought in violation of an arbitration 
agreement. The Court of Appeal ruled that even if the Arbitration 
Act of 1996 did not give an express power to the High Court to grant 
the injunction, such power could be derived from its general power 
under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981.47
Accordingly, it follows that English courts can award anti-
arbitration injunctions but will only do so in exceptional 
circumstances and specifically only where it is clear that the 
arbitration proceedings have been wrongly brought. Anti-arbitration 
injunctions should not be granted simply because the balance of 
convenience favors the injunction.48 In Compagnie Nouvelle France 
Navigation, S.A. v. Compagnie Navale Afrique du Nord, the Court of 
Appeal offered the following guidance for granting anti-arbitration 
injunctions: first, the order “must not cause injustice to the claimant 
in the arbitration;” and second, the applicant for the order “must 
satisfy the Court that the continuat[ion] of the arbitration would be 
oppressive or vexatious . . . or an abuse of the process of the 
Court.”49
This approach was confirmed in the 2006 case of Weissfisch v. 
Julius.50 In this case, an action was brought before the English High 
Court seeking: (1) a declaration that the arbitration agreement 
providing for Swiss law and a Swiss arbitral seat was void; and  
(2) an injunction restraining the sole arbitrator under the agreement 
from acting as arbitrator. The only real connection with England was 
the fact that the arbitrator was an English lawyer within the 
jurisdiction of the court. The court rejected the application on several 
grounds but in particular because the arbitration agreement stated 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. [44]-[45] (noting that in situations falling under the New York 
Convention, issues, such as forum non conveniens, are not of significant weight to 
influence an anti-arbitration decision, as the Convention does not permit 
discretionary application of an arbitration clause). 
 49. Compagnie Nouvelle France Navigation, S.A. v. Compagnie Navale 
Afrique du Nord (1966) 1 Lloyd’s List L.R. 477, 487. 
 50. Weissfisch v. Julius [2006] EWCA (Civ) 218, [32]-[35] (Eng.) 
(recognizing that ultimately the Court should refrain from issuing an injunction, as 
the applicant neglected to advance any extenuating circumstances by which the 
previously-agreed upon arbitration clause could be deemed overly burdensome). 
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expressly that disputes should be resolved by the sole arbitrator, with 
his seat in Switzerland and governed by Swiss law,51 and 
consequently, any issues as to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement were required “to be resolved in Switzerland according to 
Swiss law.”52 This was not a matter for the English courts. 
In J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd., 
Jarvis sought a stay of arbitration proceedings on the grounds that 
concurrent proceedings would be in place, that existing proceedings 
may result in inconsistent findings, and that the arbitration 
proceedings serve no useful purpose.53 The court found that it had 
jurisdiction to entertain the application but noted that an order would 
only be made in exceptional circumstances.54 In reaching its decision 
refusing an injunction, the court noted the refusal of the Commercial 
Court to grant an anti-arbitration injunction in the recent cases of 
Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. and Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi, and that, 
since January 31, 1997, there were apparently no instances of the 
Commercial Court’s granting an injunction to halt an arbitration.55 
The court further noted that: (1) it had jurisdiction to make an order 
under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of 1991; (2) the 
discretion can be exercised if (a) the injunction does not cause 
injustice, and (b) “the continuance of the arbitration would be 
oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process”;  
(3) the discretion should be used sparingly given the principles of the 
Arbitration Act; and (4) delay would be material, if not fatal, to the 
application.56
A major concern with the possibility of several conflicting 
jurisdictions is the risk of inconsistent findings. In this respect, the 
court stated: 
 51. See id. [33]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd. [2007] 
EWHC (TCC) 1262, [19] (Eng.). 
 54. See id. [21] (noting that Jarvis submitted their claim at a very late stage in 
the proceedings, two weeks before the arbitration start date, and as such this factor 
would weigh heavily against Jarvis). 
 55. See id. [39] (citing Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A. [2007] EWHC 
(Comm) 571 (Eng.) and Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 226 
(Eng.)). 
 56. Id. [40]. 
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Once those proceedings [i.e., court proceedings brought by a 
party against Jarvis] have been launched, there will be 
concurrent proceedings both in court and before the 
Arbitrator concerning the same subject matter. This carries 
the risk of inconsistent findings. Costs will be duplicated. 
Both Jarvis and Blue Circle will be fighting on two fronts 
before different tribunals about the same subject matter. 
All of those observations are true, but they do not mean that 
the arbitration is vexatious. It is an inevitable consequence of 
the mandatory language of section 9 of [the] Arbitration Act 
that from time to time there will be concurrent proceedings in 
court and before an arbitrator.57
In Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A., one of the two cases 
addressed in Jarvis, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain the 
respondents from pursuing an arbitration being conducted before the 
London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”).58 The claimant 
and the first and second respondents were shareholders in a joint 
venture company which controlled the Polish company which ran the 
largest mobile telecommunications network in Poland. A dispute had 
arisen between the claimant and respondent under an investment 
agreement to which they were parties and under which the second 
respondent had begun an arbitration in London under the rules of the 
LCIA. 
There had been other arbitrations and court proceedings between 
the parties. A draft agreement to settle the ownership of the shares in 
the Polish company and all outstanding proceedings was produced.  
It provided for disputes to be submitted to arbitration in Geneva in 
accordance with the International Chamber of Commerce rules. The 
second respondent claimed that a legally binding settlement had been 
concluded and began an arbitration in Geneva claiming a declaration 
that the settlement agreement was binding and enforceable. To avoid 
the risk of several proceedings and possibly inconsistent and 
conflicting decisions, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain 
the LCIA arbitration until after the final determination of the Geneva 
arbitration. The London arbitrators had refused the claimant’s 
request that they stay the arbitration. 
 57. Id. [45]-[46]. 
 58. See Elektrim, [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm) [1]. 
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In refusing the injunction to restrain the LCIA proceedings, the 
court reasoned, first, that under the Arbitration Act, “the scope for 
the court to intervene by injunction before an award” had been “very 
limited.”59 Second, neither the existence of the London arbitration 
nor its prosecution breached any legal or equitable right of the 
claimant. The parties had agreed to resolve disputes under the 
investment agreement by LCIA arbitration.60 The pursuit of two 
arbitrations with different subject-matters was not vexatious or 
oppressive. Third, even if the claimant could establish that some 
right had been infringed or was threatened by the continuation of the 
London arbitration or that continuation of the arbitration was 
otherwise vexatious or oppressive, the court would not grant an 
injunction under section 37 of the 1981 Act because that would be 
contrary to the parties’ agreement to refer disputes under the 
investment agreement to LCIA arbitration.61 The arbitrators had on 
three occasions refused to stay the LCIA arbitration and the court 
had “no express power under the Arbitration Act to review or 
overrule those procedural decisions in advance of an award by the 
LCIA arbitrators.”62 To do so under section 37 of the Supreme Court 
Act “would undermine the principles of the 1996 Act.”63 Fourth, in 
the circumstances of the case, the court thought it would be unjust to 
restrain the LCIA arbitration.64 The problem was due to two 
arbitration agreements on two separate issues: the second 
respondent’s claim that the settlement agreement was valid in the 
Geneva arbitration and the claimant’s claim in the LCIA under the 
investment agreement. It was inevitable that there would be a 
multiplicity of proceedings.65
In Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd., the other case referred to in 
Jarvis, the applicant (X) applied for an interim injunction to restrain 
the respondents (Y) from proceeding with arbitration.66 Y had lent 
 59. Id. [68]-[69] (noting that only two provisions of the 1996 Arbitration Act, 
sections 44(2)(e) and 72, permit a court to intervene by imposing an injunction 
before an award is made by arbitrators). 
 60. See id. [65]. 
 61. See id. [74]. 
 62. Id. [75]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. [88]. 
 65. See id. [80]. 
 66. Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 226, [1] (Eng.). 
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money to X, who had defaulted on the repayments and owed a very 
large sum. In order to postpone repayment, X had agreed to transfer 
to Y the sole share in a company that allegedly owned a valuable 
property in Moscow. However, X failed to repay the debt and the 
company was said to be worthless. Y claimed that, at the time the 
agreement was made, X knew that the company did not own the 
property, so that Y was “deceived into believing that [the company] 
had the rights to and interest in” the property that it did not have and 
was “induced to enter the [agreement] on that basis.”67 Pursuant to 
the arbitration clause in the agreement, Y began arbitration 
proceedings and claimed damages for breach of the contractual 
obligations set out in the agreement. Several months later, Y also 
began a court action to seek further damages. However, in that action 
they sought no damages for breach of the agreement or any claim in 
contract other than for the repayment of the loan, and three months 
afterwards, X applied for an injunction to restrain Y from continuing 
with the arbitration.68 X submitted that the same contractual claims 
were advanced against it in the arbitration as in the court proceedings 
and that it would be severely unjust and prejudicial to X if the 
arbitration proceedings were allowed to continue, whereas no 
injustice would be caused to Y by a stay of the arbitration.69
Mrs. Justice Gloster found that the application for the injunction 
was far too late.70 X should have applied for it immediately after the 
beginning of the court proceedings. In seeking to have the tribunal 
determine the issues that had been raised in the arbitration 
proceedings, Y had not behaved in a manner that was oppressive or 
unconscionable. Y had never sought any finding in the arbitration 
that X was a party to any fraudulent conspiracy or that X had made 
any fraudulent misrepresentations at any time.71 In effect, the arbitral 
claims were contractual, whereas the court proceedings dealt with 
issues of fraud. Moreover, Y had not pursued any claims based upon 
any alleged fraud in the arbitration.72 It would be unjust to deprive Y 
of their right to arbitrate as it would rob them of the speedy 
 67. See id. [13]. 
 68. See id. [15]-[17]. 
 69. See id. [22]. 
 70. See id. [25]. 
 71. See id. [27]. 
 72. See id. 
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enforcement of any award they might obtain and would be a waste of 
the enormous costs that Y had already incurred in the arbitration.73 
Accordingly, and in the light of the undertakings, it would be wholly 
inappropriate to grant any injunction.74
2. The United States75
It is well established that U.S. courts have a general power to grant 
anti-suit injunctions.76 Before a court may grant an anti-suit 
injunction, the following three threshold requirements must be met: 
(1) the court issuing the injunction must have jurisdiction; (2) the 
parties to both proceedings must be the same; and (3) the decision in 
the action before the court issuing the injunction must dispose of the 
foreign court proceedings. These threshold requirements are 
sometimes referred to as the “China Trade Test.”77 Once these 
requirements have been met, the standard applied for issuing an anti-
suit injunction varies depending on the court before which the 
injunction is sought.78
There appear to be different approaches among the U.S. Courts of 
Appeal to dealing with this question which are not explored here.79 
 73. See id. [30]. 
 74. See id. [32]. 
 75. Anti-arbitration injunctions are also possible under certain circumstances in 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Nigeria, Israel, Indonesia and Pakistan. See 
Lew, supra note 42, at 199. 
 76. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 77. See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987); 
see also Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 
879-80 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring that a district court possess proper jurisdiction as 
precedent to granting an injunction). 
 78. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626 (noting that although U.S. courts possess the 
ability to allow anti-suit injunctions, the various circuits disagree on which legal 
standard to apply concerning injunctive relief). 
 79. Compare Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (applying a more liberal standard in the 
consideration of granting anti-suit injunctions, declining to require a district court 
to entertain “omnipotent” notions of comity), and Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull 
Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) (employing a “lax” standard of 
considering the effect of injunction on international comity, but requiring some 
empirical evidence that the issuance of an injunction would impair international 
comity in the particular case), with Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the importance of 
considering international comity in the calculation regarding imposition of an 
injunction, recognizing that the issuance of an anti-suit injunction would 
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Suffice it to say, in each particular case the onus is on persuading the 
court that in light of “the totality of the circumstances,” including the 
nature of the actions and the policies at stake, the case is suitable for 
the anti-suit injunction being sought.80
3. Switzerland 
By contrast, anti-arbitration injunctions seem to be incompatible 
with the Swiss legal system. Indeed, in Air (PTY) Ltd. v. 
International Air Transport Ass’n,81 the Court of First Instance of the 
Canton of Geneva ruled that anti-suit injunctions, including anti-
arbitration injunctions, are contrary to the Swiss legal system.82 In 
particular, anti-arbitration injunctions have been found to contradict 
the principle of competence-competence, which is a well-established 
principle in Swiss law. According to the court: 
[A]s a matter of Swiss law there is no such thing as a 
“judicial tutelage” of the courts over arbitrators; quite to the 
contrary, Swiss law fully implements the principle of 
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” both in its positive effect . . . and 
its negative effect . . . . The jurisdiction of a court to 
determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid—which 
cannot in any event lead to an anti-suit injunction—exists 
only when the arbitration agreement is relied upon as a 
defence before the court.83
This conclusion is consistent with the decision of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal in Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas S.A. v. 
Colon Container Terminal S.A.84 There the Federal Tribunal held 
that in cases of parallel proceedings, arbitral tribunals with a seat in 
essentially limit the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’s courts), and Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (entertaining the position that the concept of international comity requires 
national courts to strive to foster international legal connections in an effort to 
improve the rule of law between nations). 
 80. See Quaak, 361 F.3d at 19. 
 81. See Tribunal de Première Instance [TPI] [Court of First Instance] May 2, 
2005, Case No. C/1043/2005-15SP (Switz.), translated in, 23 ASA BULL. 739, 739 
(2005). 
 82. See id. at 747. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Tribunale federale svizzero [TF] [Federal Court] May 14, 2001, 127 
Decisioni del Tribunale federale svizzero [DTF] III 279. 
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Switzerland must apply the principles of lis pendens and res judicata 
in order to avoid contradictory awards.85 The suggestion therefore is 
that contradictory judgments are avoided, not by preventing the 
rendering of foreign judgments, but by recognizing or enforcing such 
judgments.86
4. France 
It seems possible for French courts to order a party to halt its 
proceedings before a foreign court.87 However, Article 1458 of the 
French New Code of Civil Procedure (“NCPC”), which applies to 
both domestic and international arbitrations, provides that if a dispute 
pending before an arbitral tribunal on the basis of an arbitration 
agreement is brought before a state court, it shall declare itself 
incompetent unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and 
void, but this issue must be raised by the party.88 The court will then 
leave it to the tribunal to determine the validity and extent of the 
arbitration. 
The effect of Article 1458 of the NCCP is to ensure that the 
arbitral tribunal is the first to decide the issue of its jurisdiction prior 
to any court or other judicial authority.89 The role of the courts is 
limited to the review of the arbitrator’s award on jurisdiction at the 
annulment or enforcement stage. French courts will generally not 
 85. See id. at 283 (explaining that lis pendens and res judicata avoid contrary 
awards by respectively paralyzing and excluding the competence of the second 
judge). 
 86. See Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 
27(2)(c) (Switz.), translated in SWITZERLAND’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STATUTE (Pierre A. Karrer & Karl W. Arnold trans., Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, 1989) [hereinafter Swiss PIL Statute] (requiring that recognition of a 
decision must be withheld in the event that the issue has already been adjudicated 
in Switzerland or a third State). 
 87. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 195 (citing Banque Worms 
v. Epoux Brachot et autres (citation omitted)). 
 88. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1458 (Fr.), 
translated in THE FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Christian Dodd 
trans., 2006) [hereinafter N.C.P.C.]. 
 89. See Vera van Houtte et al., What’s New in European Arbitration?, DISP. 
RESOL. J., May-July 2008, at 10, 10 (noting that in the Cour de Cassation decision 
of Prodim v. X., a finding by a lower court that the arbitration clause possessed 
limitations did not permit the court to circumvent the rule that under NCCP Article 
1458, an arbitrator is the primary judge of his jurisdiction). 
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rule on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement until the 
arbitral tribunal has reached its own decision.90
5. Sweden 
The general practice in Sweden is for courts not to interfere with 
the arbitration process in line with its philosophy that the basis of 
arbitration is, and has always been, that of freedom of contract, trust 
in the arbitrators, and recognition of the advantages of a single, 
privately administered dispute settlement mechanism.91 However, the 
one exception to this rule relates to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, and despite recognition of the right of arbitrators to rule 
on their own jurisdiction, this does not preclude a Swedish court 
from doing so at the same time if requested by one of the parties.92
6. Should National Courts Grant Anti-Arbitration Injunctions? 
There will hardly ever be a justification for a national court to 
grant an anti-arbitration injunction of the kind discussed. The 
following observations can be made in support of this position. First, 
the principles of competence-competence, separability, and party 
autonomy all point to the overarching principle that a decision as to 
whether an arbitration should continue should be left first and 
foremost to the arbitration tribunal.93 Second, a plain reading of 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and an assessment of its 
underlying intention suggest the preclusion of anti-arbitration 
 90. See id. at 10 (highlighting the fact that Article 1458 of the NCCP 
necessitates that a court decline jurisdiction in the event that a conflict has not yet 
been brought to arbitration). 
 91. See New Arbitration Regime in Sweden, 10 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REP. 154, 154-55 (1999) (recognizing that under Swedish arbitration law, 
contracting parties are allowed to tailor their arbitration agreements, maintaining 
Sweden’s reputation as a premier location for international arbitrations). 
 92. See id. at 155 (underscoring that although a party’s challenge of an 
arbitrator may be properly brought before a court, the arbitration may continue and 
the arbitrators may issue a judgment in anticipation of the court decision). 
 93. See Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration 
Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 693, 702-03 (2006) (noting 
that generally, judicial deference for independent arbitration derives from the 
belief that the arbitrator obtains his power from the contract, as opposed to the 
state, and therefore the dispute resolution is regarded as solely the interest of the 
disputing parties, not the public at large). 
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injunctions. Article 5 states simply: “In matters governed by this 
Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this 
Law.”94
Third, only the court of the seat of arbitration has jurisdiction with 
respect to an arbitration and should exercise this only in very limited 
circumstances. There can be little justification for a court at the seat 
of an arbitration preventing challenge of an award by injunction.95 
Recognition and enforcement must be the preserve of the enforcing 
court. No court other than the court at the seat of arbitration has a 
right to interfere. Fourth, in light of the above, there can be no basis 
for any court to grant an injunction on grounds of comity, balance of 
convenience, or even whether an arbitration appears to be vexatious 
or oppressive. Instead, the only concern of the court must be the 
validity of the arbitration agreement itself.96
Fifth, although it is argued that anti-arbitration injunctions do 
sometimes serve just ends, this may often be a lengthy and costly 
process leading to parallel litigation in various fora. This can be 
illustrated by the case of General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG,97 where a 
U.S. court granted an anti-arbitration injunction to stop an arbitration 
abroad. The underlying contract provided for ICC arbitration in 
London and was concluded between General Electric and a third 
company. Deutz subsequently joined in this agreement. A dispute 
arose, and General Electric commenced court proceedings before a 
U.S. court against Deutz, alleging breach of contract. Deutz 
responded by requesting an order to compel General Electric to 
arbitration in conformity with the arbitration agreement, and it 
initiated an ICC arbitration. In response, General Electric requested 
an anti-arbitration injunction enjoining Deutz from proceeding with 
the ICC arbitration in London. 
The court granted the anti-arbitration injunction based on its 
general power to grant injunctive relief. It held that to respect the 
international nature of the arbitration, the court should decline to 
 94. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 24, art. 5. 
 95. See Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 188-89 (citing Oil & 
National Gas Commission Ltd. v. W. Co. of N. Am. (citation omitted)). 
 96. Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477. 
 97. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 129 F. Supp. 2d 776 (W.D. Pa. 2000), 
rev’d in part, 270 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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follow the restrictive standard applicable to cases of anti-suit 
injunctions against foreign court proceedings.98 The two conditions 
for the granting of an anti-arbitration injunction under the restrictive 
standard existed: the ICC arbitration commenced by Deutz 
threatened the jurisdiction of the U.S. forum, and, by commencing 
arbitration proceedings, Deutz was evading strong U.S. public 
policies.99 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the order granting the injunction, finding that the district 
court failed to follow the more restrictive approach to granting anti-
arbitration injunctions and give due regard to principles of 
international comity.100 Thus, the parties to this dispute spent much 
of their time and resources on legal proceedings that did not resolve 
their dispute. 
Sixth, abuse is most likely when a party approaches its own court 
for assistance, that court not being the seat of the arbitration. 
According to the ICC, in 2006, of the thirty-one cases where anti- 
arbitration injunctions were granted, twenty-five were granted by 
courts of the nationality of one of the parties.101
Matters become particularly suspicious when one party is a state 
or state entity, which seeks and obtains an injunction from its own 
state court. There have been several unfortunate cases of this kind. 
Himpurna California Energy v. Republic of Indonesia is the 
infamous case of an Indonesian court issuing an anti-arbitration 
injunction to stop an arbitral tribunal from rendering an award 
against an Indonesian state-owned corporation.102 The case arose 
from various contracts for the construction and operation of an 
electrical generation plant in Indonesia. The contracts provided for 
ad hoc arbitration with the seat in Jakarta under the UNCITRAL 
 98. General Elec., 129 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
 99. Id. at 790. 
 100. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 101. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 185 n.1. 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Cornell & Arwen Handley, Himpurna and Hub: 
International Arbitration in Developing Countries, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., 
Sept. 2000, at 39, 43-44; Jacques Werner, When Arbitration Becomes War: Some 
Reflections on the Frailty of the Arbitral Process in Cases Involving Authoritarian 
States, J. INT’L ARB., Aug. 2000, at 97, 99. Cf. H. Priyatna Abdurrasyid, They Said 
I Was Going To Be Kidnapped, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., June 2003, at 29, 29 
(recounting his appointment by the Republic of Indonesia as its arbitrator in the 
dispute with Himpurna and his decision not to serve as an arbitrator). 
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Rules. Two different arbitration proceedings were subsequently 
initiated against the Republic of Indonesia. After the first arbitral 
tribunal rendered an award against PLN, an Indonesian state-owned 
electricity corporation, an Indonesian court granted two injunctions: 
one ordering the suspension of the enforcement of the first award, 
and the second preventing the second arbitration from taking 
place.103
The case of Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia is another example where the courts of the state 
party obtained an injunction in order to stop arbitration proceedings 
which were taking an unfavorable turn against the state party.104 This 
arbitration had its seat in Ethiopia, but the arbitrators decided for 
convenience to hold hearings in Paris. The Ethiopian representative 
argued this was an abuse of the process. To place maximum pressure 
to halt the arbitration, the Ethiopian courts granted two anti-
arbitration injunctions, one directed against the arbitral tribunal and 
one against the claimant.105
Hub Power Co. (HUBCO) v. Water & Power Development 
Authority of Pakistan (WAPDA) is yet another example where the 
state party to an arbitration agreement obtained from the courts of its 
country an order preventing an arbitration from proceeding.106 The 
 103. Cornell & Handley, supra note 104, at 44. 
 104. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority, Case No. 
10623/AER/ACS, 21 ASA BULL. 82 (2003) (Int’l Ct. Arb. 2001); see also Antonio 
Crivellaro, Summary of the Arbitral Proceedings – International Arbitrators and 
Courts of the Seat – Who Defers to Whom?, 21 ASA BULL. 60 (2003); M. Scherer, 
The Place or ‘Seat’ of Arbitration (Possibility, and/or Sometimes Necessity of its 
Transfer?) – Some Remarks on the Award in ICC Arbitration No. 10623, 21 ASA 
BULL. 112, 112-19 (2003); Frédéric Bachand, Must an ICC Tribunal Comply With 
an Anti-Suit Injunction Issued by the Courts of the Seat of Arbitration?, MEALEY’S 
INT’L ARB. REP., Mar. 2005, at 47, 47-52. 
 105. Bachand, supra note 104, at 47. 
 106. See HubCo Judgment Transcript in the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
(Appellate Jurisdiction), Civ. App. Nos. 1398 & 1399 of 1999, The Hub Power Co. 
v. Pak. WAPDA & Fed’n of Pak., 16 ARB. INT'L 439, 456-58 (2000) [hereinafter 
HUBCO v. WAPDA], reprinted in MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., July 2000, at A-1; 
see also Louise Barrington, HUBCO v. WAPDA: Pakistan Top Court Rejects 
Modern Arbitration, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB., 385, 385-96 (2000); Nudrat B. 
Majeed, Commentary on the Hubco Judgment, 16 ARB. INT’L 431, 431-37 (2000); 
Neil Kaplan, Arbitration in Asia—Developments and Crises, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 245, 
245-60 (2002). 
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dispute arose out of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) concluded 
between HUBCO, a company incorporated in Pakistan, and 
WAPDA, a Pakistani state-owned company.  The Supreme Court of 
Pakistan had to decide which of two anti-suit injunctions to uphold. 
HUBCO had obtained an injunction restraining WAPDA from 
seeking resolution of the dispute through any other means except 
through ICC arbitration; WAPDA obtained an injunction restraining 
HUBCO from pursuing the arbitration.107 The Supreme Court of 
Pakistan held that the only question to be decided was whether the 
dispute was arbitrable.108 By majority, it decided the matters raised 
were not arbitrable as they involved matters of criminality.109 Thus, it 
decided that HUBCO must desist from pursuing the London 
arbitration and bring its claim before the courts of Pakistan.110
In Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. (SGS) v. Federation of 
Pakistan, the Pakistani Supreme Court issued an anti-arbitration 
injunction against SGS, restraining it from “taking any step, action or 
measure to pursue or participate or to continue to pursue or 
participate in the ICSID arbitration.”111 The dispute arose out of a 
contract for the assessment of all customs duties payable on goods 
imported into Pakistan. The contract contained an arbitration clause 
providing for arbitration in Islamabad under the Pakistani Arbitration 
Act of 1940.  When the dispute arose, SGS first initiated court 
proceedings in Switzerland. SGS claimed it could not rely on the 
arbitration clause because no fair trial could be expected in Pakistan. 
The Swiss courts denied SGS’s request.112 SGS then initiated an 
arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) on the basis of the Pakistan-
Switzerland bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”). On the ground that 
neither the ICSID Convention nor the Pakistan-Switzerland BIT had 
been implemented into Pakistani law, the Supreme Court granted
 107. Barrington, supra note 106, at 439-42. 
 108. Id. at 447. 
 109. Id. at 458-59. 
 110. Id. at 459; but see id. at 456 (Jehangiri J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
ICC arbitration should have been allowed to proceed). 
 111. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Fed’n of Pak., Supreme Court of 
Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdiction), Civ. App. Nos. 459 & 460 of 2002, ¶ 84, 
reprinted in 2003 Y.B. COMM. ARB. (Int’l Council for Comm. Arb.) 1312, 1341. 
 112. Id. at 1312-13. 
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Pakistan’s request to proceed with the arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act of 1940 pursuant to the contract.113
It is worth noting that tribunals refused to be intimidated and 
continued their work in most of the cases referred to above when an 
anti-arbitration order was made. 
Seventh, even if an award might eventually be set aside or 
enforcement refused by a competent court, the anti-arbitration 
injunction negates the process by which this is supposed to take 
place.114 These points are well illustrated in English court decision in 
Albon v. Naza Motor Trading.115 In that case, the claimant applied 
for an injunction restraining the respondent from pursuing arbitration 
in Malaysia on the basis that there was an oral underlying agreement 
that was subject to English law. Although there was a written joint 
venture agreement containing an arbitration clause and signed by the 
parties in Malaysia, and subject to Malaysian law, the claimant 
claimed its signature had been forged. The High Court issued an 
injunction to stop the proceedings in Malaysia until the matter of the 
authenticity of the signature had been determined by the English 
court. The judge claimed jurisdiction on the basis that (1) the oral 
contract was made under English law; (2) the respondent had applied 
for stay of the English court proceedings in favor of arbitration 
proceedings and in so doing had submitted to the English court; and 
(3) if the injunction was not granted, the instant proceedings would 
become duplicative.116
V. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS 
Anti-suit injunctions operating in personam are aimed at 
preventing or restraining proceedings in courts in breach of an 
arbitration agreement. Such injunctions are typical when there are 
concurrent proceedings in another jurisdiction. The anti-suit 
injunction is not directed at the foreign court but at the defendant 
who has promised, through the arbitration clause, not to bring foreign 
proceedings.117
 113. Id. at 1314. 
 114. See Albon v. Naza Motor Trading, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1879 (Eng.). 
 115. Id. [1]. 
 116. Id. [1], [20], [22], [27]. 
 117. Lew, Anti-Suit Injunctions, supra note 39, at 25. 
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There are three important points to be made in relation to anti-suit 
injunctions: first, the importance of the anti-suit injunction to the 
supervisory role of the national courts is by and large now widely 
recognized.118 These injunctions may have a vital role to play in the 
hands of national courts at the seat of arbitration in its supervisory 
role over the arbitration process.119 However, the hurdles to be 
surmounted before awarding an anti-suit injunction differ from 
country to country. 
For example, in England, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction is discretionary and held that 
English courts should feel no diffidence in granting injunctions 
provided they are “sought promptly and before the foreign 
proceedings are too far advanced.”120 In Aggeliki Charis Compania 
Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.P.A., the Court of Appeal upheld an 
injunction preventing a party to an arbitration in England from 
proceeding with a claim before the courts in Italy.121 Similarly, in 
Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court 
granted a ship owner an anti-suit injunction to restrain Chinese 
proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration clause found in a 
bill of lading.122 The defendants claimed that they were not bound to 
the arbitration agreement as a matter of Chinese law.123
The position of U.S. courts regarding anti-suit injunctions 
enforcing arbitration agreements is set out in BHP Petroleum 
(Americas) Inc. v. Reinhold.124 In this case, BHP Petroleum 
requested that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas compel Baer to arbitration in Texas and enjoin him from 
continuing with court proceedings in Ecuador. The court decided: 
 118. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 187. 
 119. Id. (stating that the court of the seat of the arbitration “may stay an 
arbitration or set aside an award on jurisdiction if they consider that the arbitral 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction”). 
 120. Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.P.A. (1995) 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 87, 88 (Eng.). 
 121. Id. at 96-97. 
 122. Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Ins. Co., [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893 
(Eng.). 
 123. Id. [14] (dismissing this claim as being irrelevant to the English courts 
because it is part of the dispute arising from a contract with an arbitration clause). 
 124. BHP Petroleum (Americas) Inc. v. Reinhold, Civ. No. H-97-879 (S.D. Tex. 
1997), reprinted in 12 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 1997, at I-1. 
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that an injunction barring a foreign action was proper if the 
simultaneous prosecution of an action would result in 
“inequitable hardship” and “tend to frustrate and delay the 
speedy and efficient determination of the cause.” . . . The 
focus of the inquiry is whether there exists a need to prevent 
vexatious or oppressive litigation. . . . In light of the strong 
federal policy favoring arbitration, the court finds that 
Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if Baer were permitted 
to continue litigating in Ecuador while the same claims were 
being arbitrated. Therefore, the court [grants] Plaintiffs’ 
application for injunction.125
It would appear that the approach of the U.S. courts is stricter than 
the English courts. An important criterion for the granting of the 
injunction in the United States is “irreparable harm.” This 
requirement was defined by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in Empresa Generadora de Electricidad 
ITABO v. Corporacio Dominicana de Empresas Electricas Estatales 
(CDEEE).126 In this case, ITABO, a private company incorporated in 
the Dominican Republic, requested the court to compel CDEEE, a 
company owned by the Dominican Republic, to ICC arbitration in 
New York in conformity with the arbitration agreement contained in 
ITABO’s bylaws. It also requested an anti-suit injunction to enjoin 
CDEEE from continuing with litigation in the Dominican courts. The 
court denied both requests. Concerning the anti-suit injunction, the 
court held that “ITABO [had] not met [the] heavy burden of 
establishing irreparable harm.”127 It defined this notion in the 
following terms: 
[i]njunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy 
which should not be routinely granted.” . . . Where necessary 
 125. Id. at I-4 (citing Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996)); 
see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. PT Multipolar Corp., Nos. 98-16952 & 98-
17384, 1999 WL 1079625, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (upholding an injunction 
based on equitable considerations and the fact that further litigation in home states 
would lead to delay and unnecessary expense). 
 126. No. 05 Civ. 5004, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 
2005). 
 127. Id. at *24-26 (pointing out that ITABO had allowed months to go by before 
seeking relief in court, that any harm to ITABO is speculative, and that ITABO has 
not shown that it would lose arbitration rights by complying with a future 
Dominican court order). 
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to prevent irreparable harm, “a federal court may enjoin a 
party before it from pursuing litigation in a foreign  
forum.” . . . Irreparable harm is injury that “is likely and 
imminent, not remote or speculative, and . . . is not capable of 
being fully remedied by money damages.” . . . The movant is 
required to establish not a mere possibility of irreparable 
harm, but that it is “likely to suffer irreparable harm if 
equitable relief is denied.”128
The courts of Singapore were initially reluctant to grant anti-suit 
injunctions in support of arbitration, at least when Singapore was not 
the seat of arbitration.129 In 2002, however, the Singapore High Court 
in WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd. v. Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka 
granted an anti-suit injunction against the respondent to protect the 
contractual right of WSG to refer its dispute with the board to 
arbitration in Singapore.130 This was apparently the first reported 
case of an anti-suit injunction in favor of arbitration granted in 
Singapore.131
One vital question is whether it is appropriate for a court to award 
injunctions where it has not been seized and is not the seat of 
arbitration. The Bermuda Court of Appeal considered this issue in 
IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd. v. OAO “CT-Mobile” (the 
“IPOC case”).132 The parties were involved in arbitration 
proceedings in Europe. IPOC commenced court proceedings in New 
York and in Russia. The main question before the Bermuda Court of 
Appeal was whether it was entitled to grant an injunction to restrain a 
breach of an arbitration agreement on the basis that it has in 
personam jurisdiction over IPOC (as a Bermuda company), or 
 128. Id. at *16 (citations omitted). 
 129. See Mancon (BVI) Inv. Holding Co. v. Heng Holdings SEA (Pte) Ltd. & 
Ors, [2000] 3 SLR 220, [35] (Sing.) (refusing to grant an injunction because it 
would interfere with the jurisdiction of other courts). 
 130. WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, [2002] 3 
SLR 603, [91] (Sing.). 
 131. On international arbitration in Singapore, see Andrew Chan & Tay Yong 
Seng, Securing Arbitration in the Face of Litigation—A Singapore Perspective, 2 
ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 113, 113-36 (2006). 
 132. IPOC Int’l Growth Fund Ltd. v. OAO “CT-Mobile”, Nos. 22 & 23 (Berm. 
Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007) (on file with author); see also Jan Woloniecki, 
Enforcement of Transnational Investment Arbitration Awards In Bermuda: 
Jurisdiction And Sovereign Immunity (Apr. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
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whether, as IPOC argued, the Bermuda court must in addition have 
some “sufficient interest” before it can grant an anti-suit injunction. 
The Bermuda Court of Appeal rejected the argument that only the 
court at the seat of the arbitration can issue an anti-suit injunction 
and held personal jurisdiction to be sufficient.133 While the pro-
arbitration decision is welcome, it is strongly arguable that courts 
taking jurisdiction on similar or other grounds would be unjustifiably 
interfering with the arbitration process.134 As argued above, in the 
normal course, only the court at the seat of arbitration should 
interfere with the arbitral process, and even then only rarely. 
The second point is that national courts might arguably use the 
anti-suit injunction whenever they consider it necessary to protect the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate.135 In this regard, anti-suit injunctions 
in the arbitration context are inherently different from injunctions 
awarded in other contexts. This difference has mostly to do with the 
nature of arbitration itself. Other types of injunctions are issued to 
correct or alter otherwise wrongful or unconscionable conduct. In 
anti-suit injunctions, the court’s concern ought to be to restrain a 
party from attempting to circumvent its promise to arbitrate.136 In this 
regard, the court ought not to be concerned by issues of oppressive or 
vexatious conduct, or be overly sensitive to questions of comity.137 
The injunction bites only because the parties have agreed to have 
their dispute resolved via a mechanism that transcends any individual 
jurisdiction.138 Courts ought to resist muddying the waters with any 
other concerns. 
In Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English 
High Court also confirmed that injunctions awarded in the arbitration 
context are not about wrongful or unconscionable conduct, which 
was central to the anti-suit injunction granted by the courts of 
 133. IPOC, ¶¶ 45-50. 
 134. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 455-56. 
 135. See José Carlos Fernández Rozas, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National 
Courts: Measures Addressed to the Parties or to the Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT 
INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 41, at 73, 79-80 (noting 
that anti-suit injunctions can also “paralyz[e] arbitral proceedings”). 
 136. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477. 
 137. Cf. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 192 (suggesting that 
some U.S. Courts of Appeal award anti-suit injunctions based on a vexatious or 
oppressive standard, and some use a standard based on comity). 
 138. Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 456. 
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equity,139 but more about “restraining a party to a contract from 
doing something [that it] has promised not to do.”140 Anti-suit 
injunctions made other than in the context of arbitration are not 
subject to limitations imposed by the principles of comity.141 In this 
regard, Justice Cooke referred to the speech of Lord Justice 
Longmore in O.T. Africa Line Ltd. v. Magic Sportswear Corp.: “It 
goes without saying that any court should pay respect to another 
(foreign) court but, if the parties have actually agreed that a [forum] 
is to have sole jurisdiction over any dispute, the true role of comity is 
to ensure that the parties’ agreement is respected.”142 Lord Justice 
Longmore further added to these justifications some practical 
observations, namely that the benefit of a court’s exercising its 
discretion to award an injunction at an early stage of an arbitration 
where matters are straightforward is that it will prevent matters from 
being heard twice, first before arbitrators and then again later before 
courts.143 Further, by ordering anti-suit injunctions, the applying 
party is able to benefit from contempt of court proceedings.144
A. SHOULD ARBITRATION CLAUSES BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY 
FROM JURISDICTION CLAUSES? 
One conceptual problem closely related to this area of discussion, 
and which has the potential for serious practical ramifications, is 
whether arbitration clauses ought to be treated differently from 
standard jurisdiction clauses. This is a matter that has recently 
exercised the European courts. As a general rule, regulation 44/2001 
(the “Brussels Regulation”) sets out the rules of jurisdiction that 
apply to the European Union.145 Under Article 27 of the Brussels 
 139. See Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Ins. Co., [2007] EWHC (Comm) 
1893, [44] (Eng.). 
 140. Id.; cf. Laker Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Bd., (1985) A.C. 58, ¶¶ 13-
15 (H.L.). 
 141. See Airbus Industries G.I.E. v. Patel, (1999) 1 A.C. 119, 134 (H.L.) 
(recognizing courts should, based on notions of comity, be hesitant to grant an 
anti-suit injunction, but noting there is no such requirement in cases where comity 
is breached). 
 142. Starlight, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [44] (citing O.T. Africa Line Ltd. 
v. Magic Sportswear Corp., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 710, [32] (Eng.)). 
 143. See O.T. Africa, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 710, [36], [40]. 
 144. Cf. Starlight, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [43]. 
 145. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) available  
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Regulation, regardless of what the parties may have agreed with 
respect to jurisdiction, once a court within an EU Member State has 
been seized with an action, no other court within the EU can interfere 
with the matter.146 This is the principle of lis pendens.147 It makes no 
difference how much bad faith is displayed by a party to litigation in 
starting proceedings in a Member State; it is for that Member State to 
assume or decline jurisdiction.148
It is clear from European case law that this principle applies even 
where there is a choice of jurisdiction clause.149 However,  
Article 1(2)(d) expressly excludes arbitration from the scope of the 
Brussels Regulation. The issue, though, is whether the term 
arbitration includes all matters relating to arbitration, such as the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, or whether it relates only to 
procedural matters and enforcement issues. Article 1(2)(d) of the 
Brussels Regulation and its forerunner, Article 1(4) of the Brussels 
Convention, were purposely left vague in this regard.150
This question has recently been considered by the European Court 
of Justice (“ECJ”), following a referral from the House of Lords, in 
West Tankers Inc. v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.P.A., where 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001: 
0023:EN:PDF [hereinafter Brussels Regulation] (stating persons domiciled in a 
member state are to be sued in that member state). 
 146. See id. art. 27. 
 147. See id. (entitling section 9, which contains article 27, “Lis pendens—related 
actions”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004) (defining lis 
pendens as “a pending lawsuit” or “the jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by 
a court over property while a legal action is pending”). 
 148. Cf. Brussels Regulation, supra note 146, art. 27 (leaving it to the court first 
presented with the matter to establish jurisdiction, while other courts should stay 
proceedings in the interim). 
 149. Cf. Case C-116/02, Gasser v. MISAT, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693, ¶ 49 (noting 
“it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement 
and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that 
the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive 
jurisdiction”); Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 26. On this 
whole issue, see generally Stavros Brekoulakis, The Notion of the Superiority of 
Arbitration Agreements over Jurisdiction Agreements. Time to Abandon It?, 24 J. 
INT’L ARB. 341 (2007). 
 150. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 146, art. 1(2)(d); Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 
1(4), Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 153, available at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm. 
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an insured commenced London arbitration to recover excess losses 
from a collision.151 During the course of the arbitration, the owners 
of the vessels became aware that the insurers had commenced court 
proceedings against them in Italy. The English High Court granted 
an injunction stopping the insurers from continuing with the Italian 
proceedings on the grounds that: (1) under English law the duty to 
arbitrate was an inseparable part of the subject matter transferred;  
(2) the insurer was bound by the arbitration clause; and (3) the 
attitude of the foreign court (the Italian court paid no attention to the 
injunction) was irrelevant where an arbitration clause was concerned. 
The House of Lords considered whether it is “consistent with EC 
Regulation 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order 
to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in 
another Member State” where there is a valid arbitration 
agreement.152 The Lords considered that this was a matter that should 
be referred to the ECJ.153 However, in making the reference, the 
Lords expressed their views, which are not binding on any court, but 
which indicated the way the House of Lords hoped (unsuccessfully) 
this issue would be resolved.154 Lord Hoffman, for example, opined 
that an order for restraint where a party had started proceedings 
contrary to an arbitration clause was not contrary to the Brussels 
regulation: 
The basic principles by which the [Brussels] regulation 
allocates jurisdiction, giving priority (subject to exceptions) 
to the domicile of the defendant, are entirely unsuited to 
arbitration, in which the situs and governing law are generally 
chosen by the parties on grounds of neutrality, availability of 
legal services and the unobtrusive effectiveness of the 
supervisory jurisdiction. There is no set of uniform 
Community rules which Member States can or must trust 
each other to apply.155
 151. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA v. West Tankers Inc., [2007] 
UKHL 4, [11]-[12] (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 152. Id. [23]. 
 153. Id. [25]. 
 154. Id. [9] (restricting the basis for the opinion of Lord Hoffman solely to the 
Brussels Regulation). 
 155. Id. [12]. 
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Lord Hoffman’s reasoning is correct, and it would be quite wrong 
for the ECJ to allow arbitration agreements to be undermined by a 
party simply by starting proceedings in a court of the European 
Union. No matter what the wording of the Brussels Regulation was 
intended to mean, there are very good reasons for courts to treat 
jurisdiction clauses differently from arbitration clauses. First, 
jurisdiction clauses serve to allocate jurisdiction between national 
regimes; the national regimes therefore remain in play. In contrast, 
an agreement to arbitrate takes the dispute out of any national 
framework and places it within a self-contained regime.156
Secondly, in the arbitration context, it is not a matter of a contest 
between rival national jurisdictions. Instead, any powers the courts 
have are supervisory.157 Proper jurisdiction lies with the arbitral 
tribunal. This is vital because the arbitral tribunal is not a party to 
any convention or agreement relating to jurisdiction and has no need 
to respect comity.158 In fact, the sole duty of the tribunal is to carry 
out the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the normal course, 
arbitration proceedings will not be stayed while national court 
proceedings are pending.159
The European Court of Justice judgment was handed down on 10 
February 2009.160 It determined that the use of an anti-suit injunction 
to prevent a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction to 
resolve a dispute under Regulation No 44/2001 from ruling on the 
applicability of the regulation to the dispute brought before it seeks 
to deny that court of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction under 
Regulation No 44/2001. The Court held: 
 156. But cf. Brekoulakis, supra note 150, at 342 (arguing as between arbitration 
and jurisdiction agreements, arbitration agreements have a more favorable status 
because they are better regulated and more favored by the courts). 
 157. Cf. id. at 343 (finding the “legal framework” of arbitration “establishes a 
duty for the national courts to enforce an arbitration agreement whenever they are 
seized of a dispute covered by the scope of the arbitration agreement”). 
 158. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 8; cf. Yuval Shany, 
Comment, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID 
Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 849-50 
(2005) (noting ICSID arbitrators find judicial comity inherent in the judicial 
process). 
 159. Cf. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 24, art. 8(2). 
 160. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc, 2009 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 24 (Feb. 10, 2009). 
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It is incompatible with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters for 
a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a 
person from commencing or continuing proceedings before 
the courts of another Member State on the ground that such 
proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement.161
This decision bars English courts from granting anti-suit 
injunctions to restrain a party bringing proceedings in a court of a 
European Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement. 
However, this decision is not necessarily anti-arbitration. It leaves it 
to each national court in which proceedings are brought to decide for 
itself whether the arbitration agreement is valid and binding and 
covers the specific dispute between the parties. There is of course a 
risk of parallel proceedings, additional costs, the possibility for a 
financially stronger party to exert pressure on a weaker party by 
additional proceedings and even conflicting decisions. It will be for 
the national courts to try and keep such abuses to a minimum by 
applying Article II of the New York Convention strictly. 
One must recognize that it is possible for national courts to misuse 
anti-suit injunctions, but this was not a reason for the ECJ 
decision.162 The greatest risk of such misuse appears to be when they 
are granted after the arbitration award, that is, where they are 
employed by courts of the seat of an arbitration to protect an 
arbitration award that has already been made. There are several 
recent examples of instances where anti-suit injunctions of this type 
have been sought. In Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern 
General Insurance Co., the English court exercised its discretion to 
grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent a defendant to arbitration 
proceedings from continuing an action commenced in a different
 161. Id. [35]. 
 162. See Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. Ltd. v. M/T Beffen, 475 F.3d 56, 65 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (cautioning that “due regard for principles of international comity and 
reciprocity require a delicate touch in the issuance of anti-foreign suit injunctions, 
that such injunctions should be used sparingly, and that the pendency of a suit 
involving the same parties and same issues does not alone form the basis for such 
an injunction”). 
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jurisdiction designed to nullify the arbitration award made against 
it.163
In C v. D, the English court held that an insured was entitled to an 
anti-suit injunction preventing the insurer from challenging a London 
arbitration award in the United States because the attempt to invoke 
the jurisdiction of another court was a breach of the contract to 
arbitrate.164 The insurer threatened to apply to the New York courts 
on the ground that the award was “a manifest disregard of New York 
law.”165 This constituted a threatened breach of the arbitration 
agreement and had to be stopped.166 Mr Justice Cooke found that the 
agreement dealing with the seat of arbitration was “akin to an 
agreement to an exclusive jurisdiction clause,” and that such 
agreement included an agreement that the courts at the seat of 
arbitration had supervisory powers.167 Further, by agreeing to the seat 
of arbitration, the parties agreed that any challenges to an award were 
“to be made only in the courts of the place designated as the seat of 
arbitration.”168 In this regard, the choice of New York as the 
Governing Law was found to be irrelevant when it came to 
challenging the arbitration award. To take a step that would “negate 
the whole framework in which the arbitration took place” was 
vexatious, oppressive, unconscionable, and an abuse of process.169 
C was therefore entitled to injunctive relief. 
In KBC v. Pertamina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit upheld an injunction to prevent Pertamina from taking 
proceedings in the Cayman Islands to recover moneys paid out under 
an award against it on the pretext that the award was procured by 
fraud.170 This infamous, longstanding, and multi-faceted litigation 
involved proceedings in different jurisdictions, including an 
arbitration which found against Pertamina.  The Court of Appeals 
 163. See generally Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern Gen. Ins. Co., 
[2006] EWHC (Comm) 253 (Eng.). 
 164. See generally C v. D, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282 (Eng.). 
 165. Id. [7]. 
 166. Id. [29]. 
 167. See C v. D, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1541, [29] (Eng.). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. [58]; see also Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern Gen. Ins. 
Co., [2006] EWHC (Comm) 253, [95] (Eng.). 
 170. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 125 n.17 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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held that in this case, an anti-suit injunction was necessary “to 
prevent Pertamina from engaging in litigation that would tend to 
undermine the regime established by the Convention for recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards.”171 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
recognized the importance of comity, the importance of respect for 
the capacities of foreign transnational tribunals, and the need to be 
sensitive to the needs of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes. However, here there was 
no mere disagreement with the way the arbitral award had been 
enforced. This would not justify an injunction. Instead, where there 
was a concerted effort to undermine the arbitral process the court 
found that “federal courts are not obliged to sit by idly when a party 
engages in proceedings that undermine the regime governing 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards established by the 
Convention.”172  The appeal against the injunction was dismissed and 
the injunction allowed.173
In a recent Peruvian case, an injunction was awarded by the Civil 
Court of Lima to preserve an award granted under the 1996 Peruvian 
Arbitration Act.174 The original award obliged the Peruvian mining 
companies to transfer the rights in a gold and silver mine to Sulliden 
and its Peruvian subsidiary. This injunction, however, was released 
as the court was persuaded that the official who signed the contract 
containing the arbitration lacked the required authority.175
Injunctions granted by courts other than at the seat of the 
arbitration or the place of enforcement of an award against foreign 
proceedings in connection with an award, although perhaps on 
occasion justified on grounds of justice, will often be counter to the 
fundamental principles of international arbitration. First, the seat of 
arbitration has a supervisory role only until an award has been 
made.176 It has no duty to offer to protect an award as a matter of 
 171. Id. at 125. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 130. 
 174. See generally Sulliden, Press Releases: December 18, 2007, 
http://www.sulliden.com/PressReleases_en/PR_20071218.html. 
 175. See Peru Sets Aside Contract Arbitration Award, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Sept. 
2007, at 6; see generally Sulliden, http://www.sulliden.com. 
 176. Cf. Graham Dunning QC, Stop – or go?  Injunctions and Arbitration, 
Master’s Lecture before the Worshipful Company of Arbitrators 7-8 (Mar. 13, 
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right. The proper way to challenge an award is at the courts of the 
seat of arbitration or to resist enforcement at the place of 
enforcement, and this is only on limited grounds.177 The court at the 
seat of arbitration should not interfere with this process. 
Secondly, the court of the place of enforcement has no duty or 
power to protect an arbitration award made in a foreign state.178 Its 
duty is only to enforce an award in accordance with the New York 
Convention. A court seized with an action has the sole right to 
determine the legitimacy of that action and to decide on its own 
jurisdiction. Any other approach to those set out above cannot be 
justified in terms of the New York Convention and the autonomous 
nature of arbitration. It undermines trust between Convention states, 
raises issues of international comity and respect between nations, and 
opens the way to confusion and ultimately injustice.179
B. PRO-ARBITRATION ORDERS 
Pro-arbitration orders are orders issued by national courts for 
specific performance of arbitration agreements. On their face these 
injunctions offer powerful support for the arbitration process in that 
they directly compel parties to undertake what they have already 
agreed upon. There are two important issues relating to courts’ 
compelling arbitration. The first is whether orders compelling 
arbitration accord with the underlying principles of the international 
arbitration regime. The second issue is that if such orders are made, 
how far should they reach, and in particular, should courts be entitled 
to make orders against parties who are not on the face of the 
arbitration clause party to the arbitration agreement? 
1. When Should Courts Compel Parties to Arbitrate? 
This question is handled differently in different jurisdictions. The 
United States offers courts the greatest powers in terms of ordering 
specific performance. In the United States, an arbitration agreement 
2008), available at http://www.arbitratorscompany.com/pdfs/Master's_Lecture_ 
2008_text.pdf. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Cf. id. at 8 (arguing under the New York Convention scheme, control of a 
final award is the sole responsibility of the courts where enforcement is sought). 
 179. Cf. id. 
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can be enforced by a court order forcing a reluctant party to go to 
arbitration, and a party that does not follow the court’s order will be 
in contempt of court.180 Sections 4 and 206 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) allow a party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a 
contracting party to arbitrate under a written arbitration agreement to 
seek an order directing that such party participate in the arbitration as 
agreed and that a party who ignores the order will be in contempt of 
court.181 This compelling power applies even if the agreed-upon seat 
of the arbitration is outside the United States. It can have very 
important implications for default awards as too often parties decide 
for tactical reasons, which may assist in resisting enforcement, to 
refuse to participate in the arbitration despite the arbitration 
agreement.182
This power was exercised in Paramedics Electromedicina 
Comercial, Ltd. v. GE Medical Systems Information Technologies, 
Inc., where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted a motion to compel the performance of an arbitration 
agreement providing for arbitration under the rules of the Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration Commission in Miami.183 When a 
dispute arose, Paramedics brought suit before a Brazilian court 
notwithstanding the arbitration agreement. GE Medical Systems 
initiated arbitration proceedings. When Paramedics requested an 
anti-arbitration injunction from a New York court, GE Medical 
Systems requested an order compelling arbitration and an anti-suit 
injunction enjoining Paramedics from continuing with the Brazilian 
court proceedings. The court rejected Paramedics’ request for an 
anti-arbitration injunction against GE Medical Systems. At the same 
time, it granted both the motion to compel Paramedics to arbitration 
and the anti-suit injunction enjoining Paramedics from continuing 
with the Brazilian action. The court held that where it is established 
 180. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
380 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing court orders compelling the performance of 
arbitration agreements in U.S. law). 
 181. Federal Arbitration Act §§ 4, 206, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206 (2006). 
 182. Id. § 4 (providing recourse for an aggrieved party “if the jury find that an 
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in 
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the 
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof”). 
 183. 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming the judgment of the District 
Court in granting “GEMS-IT’s motion to compel arbitration”). 
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that an arbitration agreement exists and that one of the parties to this 
agreement is not in compliance with it, an order compelling 
arbitration without further proceedings may be issued.184
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the anti-suit injunction and the imposition of sanctions, but 
remanded for reconsideration of the amount of the sanctions. The 
Second Circuit held that “[a]n anti-suit injunction against parallel 
litigation may be imposed only if: (A) the parties are the same in 
both matters, and (B) resolution of the case before the enjoining 
court is dispositive of the action to be enjoined.”185  The court found 
that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the” 
defendant sufficiently met the two requirements.186 Cases such as 
these take their steer from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the 
Court stated that a party that makes a bargain to arbitrate “should be 
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude 
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”187
Although pro-arbitration injunctions ought to appeal to those who 
support arbitration, there are good reasons to doubt whether they are 
beneficial to the arbitral process and/or accord with the core 
principles of arbitration practice.  First, most national laws do not 
expressly allow courts to order parties to participate in arbitration 
proceedings even where there is a valid arbitration agreement. Rather 
the pressure is negative by refusing access to the court for matters 
covered by the arbitration agreement.188 There is nothing in the New 
York Convention to suggest that a court has a duty to compel 
arbitration. Courts only have a duty to “refer” a party to 
arbitration.189 The same language is used in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.190 The French NCPC requires a court to “decline jurisdiction” 
 184. Id. at 649 (concluding “that the anti-suit injunction was an appropriate 
measure to enforce and protect the judgment compelling arbitration”). 
 185. See id. at 652. 
 186. Id. at 652-54. 
 187. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 188. See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993] A.C. 
334, 367-68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.) (holding that court had power to 
stay proceedings brought in violation of arbitration agreement). 
 189. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 3. 
 190. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 8, § 1. 
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in the face of an arbitration clause,191 the Swiss PILA (Private 
International Law Statute) also requires a court to “decline 
jurisdiction”;192 the German ZPO (Civil Procedure Code) requires 
national authorities to reject court proceedings brought in breach of 
an arbitration agreement as being inadmissible;193 and section 9 of 
the English Arbitration Act of 1996 provides for a stay of court 
action.194
The Channel Tunnel case is a prominent example where a court 
refused to order parties to arbitration but stayed the court 
proceedings in support of an arbitration agreement.195 Eurotunnel 
(the owners of the tunnel) and Trans-Manche Link (a consortium of 
English and French companies) had concluded a contract for the 
construction of a tunnel under the English Channel between England 
and France. The contract provided for a two-stage dispute resolution 
mechanism. First, any dispute between Eurotunnel and Trans-
Manche Link should be brought before a Panel of Experts. Then, if 
either party disagreed with the Panel’s decision, the dispute could be 
referred to ICC arbitration with its seat in Brussels. A dispute arose 
as to the amounts payable in respect of the works on the tunnel’s 
cooling system. Trans-Manche Link threatened to suspend their work 
alleging a breach of contract by Eurotunnel. Eurotunnel brought an 
action in the English courts requesting an interim injunction to 
restrain Trans-Manche Link from suspending their works. Trans-
Manche Link argued that the English courts did not have the power 
to order such an injunction. 
In addition, Trans-Manche Link requested a stay of the action 
brought by Eurotunnel in favor of the arbitration on the basis of the 
then governing Arbitration Act of 1975. The English House of Lords 
decided to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration based on the 
 191. N.C.P.C.,  supra note 88, art. 1458. 
 192. Swiss PIL Statute, supra note 86, art. 7. 
 193. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Dec. 5, 2005, 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I, 3302, as amended, § 1032, ¶ 1 (F.R.G.), translated in 
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Charles 
E. Stewart trans., 2001). 
 194. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 9 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ukpga_19960023_en#sch1. 
 195. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993] A.C. 
334, 367-68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.). 
  
530 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:489 
 
court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings brought before it in 
breach of an arbitration agreement.196 Section 9 of the 1975 
Arbitration Act further provided in its fourth paragraph that “the 
court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement 
is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”197 
The obligation to stay proceedings under section 9 applies even if the 
arbitral seat “is outside England and Wales or Northern Ireland or no 
seat has been designated or determined.”198 However, there is no 
power under the English Arbitration Act of 1996 for the courts to 
order a party to participate in an arbitration. Instead of actively 
enforcing an arbitration agreement, therefore, most national courts 
are similarly limited to a passive role, giving effect to the arbitration 
agreement only indirectly.199
Secondly, the stay of court proceedings brought in breach of an 
arbitration agreement might be indirect but is nevertheless an 
efficient means of ensuring respect for an arbitration agreement 
while keeping court involvement to a minimum. It forces the 
claimant to go to arbitration, or at least is a major incentive, because 
the latter will have no other forum in which to bring his claim.200
Thirdly, pro-arbitration agreements threaten the principle of 
competence-competence, in that arbitrators could feel inhibited to 
reach a decision different from that of a national court that has 
compelled the arbitration.201 The assumption is that if a court has 
 196. Id. at 352. 
 197. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 9, ¶ 4 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ ukpga_19960023_en_1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 198. Id. § 2, ¶ 2(a). 
 199. Channel Tunnel, [1993] A.C. at 367-68 (determining that the parties’ 
choice of arbitration to resolve their disputes outweighed the need to protect the 
party seeking an injunction). 
 200. See JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION para. 497 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti 
trans., 2d ed. 2007) (“English law is peculiar because the court can neither declare 
itself incompetent nor refer the parties to arbitration, but can only stay its 
proceedings. It is thus essentially by generalising the mandatory character of the 
stay and leaving aside the additional requirement of the existence of a dispute that 
the Arbitration Act 1996 has reinforced respect of the arbitration agreement . . . .”). 
 201. See William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of 
Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 144-45 (1997) 
(claiming that government interference with arbitration means that arbitrators 
cannot determine their own jurisdiction). 
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issued a pro-arbitration order it will have satisfied itself that there is a 
valid arbitration agreement. This of course is not the case: rather it is 
still for the arbitral tribunal to make the primary decision on 
jurisdiction. 
Fourthly, pro-arbitration injunctions threaten the sanctity of party 
autonomy in that parties agree to go to arbitration on the basis that 
the party who believes itself to have been wronged initiates the 
arbitral process. The arbitral agreement is not founded on the power 
of the courts to force a recalcitrant party to settle its disputes through 
arbitration.202
2. How Far Should Such Orders Reach: To Include Third Parties 
Allegedly Covered by the Arbitration Agreement? 
If courts are prepared to compel parties to arbitrate their disputes, 
where does the process stop? Are courts justified in compelling a 
party who is not an express or named party to the arbitration clause 
to abide by the arbitration agreement, solely on the basis of closeness 
of relationship to one of the main parties to the arbitration or on 
account of some other factor? This of course is the controversial 
issue of companies and entities which are the alter egos of the state. 
This issue is increasingly raised, and many consider that it should be 
determined by the arbitrators rather than a national court.203
The courts appear to have a mixed approach to this issue. Two 
recent English cases reached opposite conclusions. In UK Film 
Finance Inc. v. Royal Bank of Scotland, an arbitration agreement was 
directed at only two of three parties, and the English court extended 
the scope of the agreement to cover all three.204 However, in 
Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court 
found that it had no jurisdiction to grant an order in favor of the ship 
manager
 202. Cf. Linda R. Boyle, Note, Three’s Company: Examining the Third-Party 
Problem through an Analysis of Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 261, 262 (2008) (stating that the power for an arbitration tribunal 
stems from agreement between the parties). 
 203. See id. at 262 (arguing that arbitrators should be able to make jurisdictional 
decisions regarding third parties). 
 204. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 195, [48] (Eng.). 
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despite the proceedings being vexatious and oppressive as a matter of 
English law.205
In the United States, courts have relied on the principle of estoppel 
to read an arbitration agreement as covering parties who are not 
ostensibly party to that agreement.206 However, in 2007, in Regent 
Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, a federal judge in 
Miami refused to extend an arbitration agreement in a charter 
agreement to parties to the related shipbuilding contract.207 Regent 
and Radisson had entered into a time charter agreement containing 
an arbitration clause. Regent was the owner of the vessel. It claimed 
that Rolls Royce and Alstom “defrauded and deceived” it into 
installing the Mermaid pod propulsion system.208 These parties 
requested that the court compel Regent to arbitrate the dispute based 
on the charter agreement. U.S. Judge Paul C. Huck of the Southern 
District of Florida found that the petitioners could not enforce the 
time-charter’s arbitration clause because “[i]t is inconceivable that, 
as non-signatories, they would be able to compel Regent to arbitrate 
claims that do not even appear to arise out of the Time Charter 
agreement.”209
The São Paulo Court of Appeal held that a controlling shareholder 
was bound by an arbitration agreement included in a contract to 
which it was not expressly a party, given that there was sufficient 
evidence of its inherent connection to the legal relationship.210 Some 
commentators have gone further than the São Paulo Court and 
argued for extension when the same economic or operational purpose 
can be identified.211 This is a complicated and controversial area and 
 205. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [42] (Eng.). 
 206. See Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, Nos. 06-22347-
CIV & 06-22539-CIV, 2007 WL 601992, at *7-8 (S. D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007). 
 207. Id. at *11-12. 
 208. Id. at *1. 
 209. Non-Signatories Not Bound to Arbitrate, Florida Judge Rules, MEALEY’S 
INT’L ARB. REP., Mar. 2007, at 7, 7-8. 
 210. See Paul E. Mason & Mauricio Gomm-Santos, New Keys to Arbitration in 
Latin America, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 31, 59-60 (2008) (citing Trelleborg do Brasil Ltd. 
v. Anel Empreendimentos Participacoes e Agropecuaria Ltd. (citation omitted)); 
see also the French CA Paris case of November 30, 1988 Korsnas Marma v. 
Durand-Auzias. 
 211. See, e.g., Olagoke O. Olatawura, The “Privy to Arbitration” Doctrine: The 
Withering of the Common-Law Privity of Contract Doctrine in Arbitration Law, 16 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 429, 460 (2005). 
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each case can only be discussed on its merits. The real question is 
who properly should decide what was agreed, and who does it bind: 
a national court selected by the party wishing to achieve a particular 
result or the arbitration mechanism selected by the parties? 
The main justification for courts to interfere with arbitration in this 
way is to save costs and time, to ease the administrative burden, and 
to allow for an efficient settlement of disputes, including consistency 
of decision making.212 Although, these objectives are worthy, it is 
essential that the arbitral process remain autonomous, and it is for 
arbitrators to decide who the proper parties are and whether third 
parties were properly covered by this arbitration agreement. 
There is a danger that pro-arbitration injunctions will not reach 
their target because they will not be respected by another court.213 
There also exists the possibility that one injunction leads to a battle 
of injunctions.214 For example, in Dependable Highway Express, Inc. 
v. Navigators Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently considered the situation where Navigators had 
obtained an injunction from the English courts forbidding 
Dependable from proceeding with litigation in U.S. courts in relation 
to an indemnity contract.215 The Ninth Circuit found that it was not 
necessary to recognize the English injunction because its sole 
purpose was to interfere with the U.S. suit. The court stated: 
Indeed, “there are limitations to the application of comity. 
When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the 
policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend 
either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, 
undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No 
nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign
 212. Cf. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the 
Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1206 (2003) 
(emphasizing economy, efficiency, and effectiveness as objectives of dispute 
resolution). 
 213. See, e.g., Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 
F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 214. See, e.g., Comandate Marine Corp. v. Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd. 
(2006) FCAFC 192, ¶¶ 16-20 (Austl.). 
 215. Dependable, 498 F.3d at 1062. 
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interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the 
domestic forum.”216
3. What Other Options are There to Compel Arbitration 
Other than by Injunction? 
Can a party forced to go to court to claim damages for breach of 
contract, that is, failure to arbitrate? This would include the cost of 
preventing any court proceedings. The initial difficulty with this 
argument is that it could be applied to any claim in damages. Is there 
something different in arbitration that, unlike other forms of 
contractual breach, the costs should not be treated as costs in the 
litigation? Is the fact that the agreement was to resolve a dispute in a 
certain way a justification for a separate damages claim? 
In England, courts have held that a failure to abide by a dispute 
resolution clause can sound in damages. In Union Discount Co. v. 
Zoller, the English Court of Appeal found that there was no objection 
to a claim for damages based on a breach of contract. Union and 
Zoller were parties to a series of contracts, each of which contained a 
jurisdiction clause. In 2001, Union commenced proceedings in 
England against Zoller for sums due under the contracts. Zoller 
initiated proceedings in New York. Union successfully applied to 
strike out the New York proceedings as being in breach of the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause. It was common ground that Union did 
not ask the New York court for its costs of that application, since 
under New York law they were not recoverable. In the English 
proceedings, Union added a claim to recover the costs of the New 
York proceedings as damages for breach of contract. 217
This was recently revisited in A v. B, where there was an 
agreement between parties and an arbitrator to settle existing 
disputes by arbitration in Switzerland and under Swiss law.218 One 
party unsuccessfully brought proceedings in the English courts for an 
anti-arbitration injunction against the arbitrator and the other parties. 
On the question of whether the successful party was entitled to 
 216. Id. at 1067 (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 217. Union Discount Co. v. Zoller, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1755, [31] (Eng.). 
 218. A v. B, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 54, [16]-[17] (Eng.). 
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recover indemnity costs, i.e., more than the normal amount of costs 
allowed under the English system for taxation of costs, the English 
court stated that, provided that it could be established that the other 
party was in breach of the arbitration or jurisdiction clause and that 
the breach had caused the innocent party reasonably to incur legal 
costs, those costs should normally be recoverable on an indemnity 
basis.219
An interesting question is who should determine this damages 
question: the court where anti-arbitration proceedings are brought or 
the arbitration tribunal that has jurisdiction? This author suggests it 
should be the latter that determines damages. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In relation to the question of whether national court involvement 
undermines the arbitral process, the answer is that it depends on the 
nature and circumstances of the involvement. In this respect, it must 
be remembered that national courts operate in different legal and 
cultural contexts: there are common law and civil law jurisdictions; 
developing and developed countries; legal systems with or without 
political or religious influences. The way that each national court 
views its relationship to international arbitration is inevitably colored 
by these factors.220
However, notwithstanding the above, there are a number of 
principles that ought to inform the way in which national courts 
approach the issue of their involvement with international arbitration. 
First, despite its autonomous character, international arbitration 
depends on national courts to provide effectiveness, support, and 
assistance for the process. Second, international arbitration does not 
depend on national courts for legitimacy; this exists as of right, based 
on the agreement of the parties, the New York Convention, and 
 219. See id. [54]; see also Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Rabobank Nederland, 
[2007] EWHC (Comm) 1742, [36] (Eng.); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. Den.-Nor.-
Swed. v. Sunrock Aircraft Corp., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 882, [37]-[42] (Eng.). On 
the issue of damages for breach of arbitration clauses, see generally Justin 
Michealson & Gordon Blanke, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Recoverability of 
Legal Costs as Damages for Breach of an Arbitration Agreement, 74 INT’L J. ARB., 
MEDIATION & DISPUTE MGMT. 12 (2008). 
 220. Carbonneau, supra note 213, at 1193-94. 
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international arbitration practice.221 Third, accordingly, national 
courts should become involved where they are asked to give effect to 
the agreement to arbitrate and support the process agreed between 
the parties, including by assisting with the establishment of the 
tribunal, the protection and collection of evidence for use in the 
arbitration, and, if need be, preservation of the status quo. Fourth, 
once an award has been made, courts should seek to give effect to the 
tribunal’s award because it is a recognition of the autonomous 
character of arbitration, an implied agreement of the parties to honor 
the award of the arbitrators and the New York Convention—which 
of course contains the exceptions to the general rule.222
Fifth, with respect to injunctions, all injunctions have the capacity 
to be abused and used as vehicles for mischief making. If an 
injunction fails to reach its target, it will not be respected by another 
court and could be a source of a second litigious front, which the 
parties no doubt would have wished to avoid. There also exists the 
possibility that one injunction leads to a battle of injunctions. Anti-
suit injunctions, which aim to restrain a party from resorting to a 
national court, are often justified. They support the arbitration 
process by directing parties to the forum chosen by the parties to 
determine their differences. The main focus in deciding whether to 
grant an injunction ought to be the parties’ agreement to settle their 
dispute by arbitration rather than issues of oppression or fairness or 
any broader effects of the decision on matters of comity. These 
injunctions ought to be granted only by the seat of the arbitration and 
prior to an award’s being granted. The tribunal can then, as it is 
authorized and in accordance with the competence-competence 
doctrine, determine its own jurisdiction. 
Most abusive are the anti-arbitration injunctions. Although these 
are rare, they are often applied for with the specific intention of 
undermining the arbitration process. Here again this is not a matter 
for a court: if there is some reason the arbitration cannot or should 
not proceed, this should be determined by the method chosen by the 
parties, i.e., an arbitration tribunal. Pro-arbitration orders may well 
stem from good intentions, but they run the risk of undermining the 
arbitration process by failing to recognize the self-correcting 
 221. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. I. 
 222. Id., art. V. 
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measures built into the arbitration system.223 An over-zealous court is 
in clear danger of trespassing on the domain of the arbitral tribunal 
and/or pre-empting the decision of such a tribunal. The safest course 
is for the national court to content itself with offering passive support 
and recognition. 
Further, national courts should take a hands-off approach when 
parties have agreed on arbitration because there is an inevitable 
parochialism in every national court—no matter how strongly it 
avows an internationalist perspective. Every international arbitration 
gives rise to a unique blend of legal perspectives that derive from the 
various backgrounds of the participating lawyers, arbitrators, and 
parties.224 A national court asked to intervene cannot possibly fully 
take account of these perspectives in reaching its decisions. The 
same cannot be said of the arbitrators who are intimately involved in 
the arbitration and are therefore well (or at least much better) placed 
to understand its every nuance. As a matter of practical wisdom, 
matters are very often best left to them to decide. 
However, it is also the case that arbitrators and parties must give 
national courts due respect because it is the national courts that 
ultimately hold the keys to recognition and enforcement. To return to 
the analogy used earlier, if national courts refuse to provide the 
nourishment and sustenance sought at the right time and in the right 
place, the giant squid of international arbitration might be forced into 
shallower waters, where it will inevitably find itself in peril. 
 
 223. See Park, supra note 202, at 140-42. 
 224. See Boyle, supra note 203, at 264. 
